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Introduction 
 
So long as the world depends on carbon to fuel economic activity, the future of the climate will 
depend on the scale of that activity. The extent of climate change depends in no small part upon the 
pace of growth in per-capita output as well as upon population growth.  
 
As such, the harm caused by faster population growth is clear. A larger population requires more 
farmland to produce food, and increased economic activity means greater carbon emissions and 
more intense climate change.1 A recent study estimated that by 2100, slower population growth 
could reduce carbon emissions by 40 percent, significantly slowing the projected rise in average 
global temperatures.2  
 
But policymakers in many countries view slow population growth as a source of concern. In 
Denmark, low birth rates have garnered attention sufficient to spur one company to offer incentives 
for couples to conceive while on vacation.3 In Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei seeks to reverse the 
historic fall in that nation’s birth rates.4 And in Japan, The Economist has referred to population 
declines as a “demographic time bomb.”5 What is the harm in slower population growth?  
 
In fact, slow population growth need not make public programs unaffordable. In the United States, 
for example, the difference in per-person income growth between the Social Security Trustees’ High 
Cost (low population) and Low Cost (high population) scenarios is about 6/100ths of 1 percentage 
point, or less than 5 percent by 2090.6 By contrast, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that 
per-capita income will have grown 235 percent between 2014 and 2089. 
 
Thus, productivity gains by far overwhelm any age effects of slow population growth, and generally 
only minor changes are required to cover promised pension benefits. Even 75 years from now, the 
                                                 
1  Eduardo Porter, “Reducing Carbon by Curbing Population,” The New York Times, August 5, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/business/economy/population-curbs-as-a-means-to-cut-carbon-
emissions.html?ref=business.  
2  O'Neill, B. C., M. Dalton, R. Fuchs, L. Jiang, S. Pachauri, and K. Zigova. "Global Demographic Trends And Future Carbon 
Emissions." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, no. 41 (2010): 17521-7526. Accessed December 9, 2014. 
http://www.pnas.org/content/107/41/17521.full. 
3  Heather Saul, “Do it for Denmark: Competition Calls for Danes to Have More Sex to 'Tackle Declining Birth Rates,’” The 
Independent, March 28, 2014,  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/do-it-for-denmark--competition-calls-for-
danes-to-have-more-sex-to-tackle-declining-birth-rates-9218490.html.  
4  “Iran’s Leaders are Worried About Their Country’s Declining Population,” The Economist, June 7, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21603477-irans-leaders-are-worried-about-their-countrys-declining-
population-make-more 
5  “The Incredible Shrinking Country,” The Economist, March 25, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/03/japans-
demography 
6  We scale the Intermediate projection for GDP by the High and Low projections for population aged 20-64 and divide by the 
corresponding projections for total population. Thus, the estimated relative per-person income is equal to the ratio of the total 
dependency ratios (each plus 1.0) for a difference of 4.7 percent by 2090. This difference includes variation in life expectancy as 
well as fertility. See http://www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2014/lr5a2.html 
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Social Security program could pay a higher real monthly benefit to retirees with no changes 
whatsoever. With a small tax increase, the program can pay all promised benefits and leave real 
wages more than 50 percent higher than today.7 
 
To take a more extreme example, the United States spends some twice as much per person on 
health care and still lags behind in life expectancy when compared to other highly developed 
countries. If the U.S. spent like its peers, the long-run budget would be in surplus. In the United 
States, the government’s long-term fiscal deficit is driven almost entirely by the high and rising cost 
of health care spending per person-- not population aging.  
 
In this paper, we step through the construction of relatively simple socioeconomic projections, 
observing the chain of effects that population growth has upon climate change. We find that our 
rough estimates agree with the more detailed assessment and produce a rough rule of thumb: An 
additional 1 percentage point of population growth through the end of the century may coincide 
with an additional 2 degrees Fahrenheit in average global temperatures. 
 
 
Population Growth and Climate Change 
 
We employ the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) to estimate the effects of population 
growth on the change in global average temperature by 2100. Roughly speaking, increases in 
population growth raise growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) one-for-one. Depending on the 
state of energy technology at the time, GDP translates proportionally into releases of carbon dioxide 
(CO2). These emissions cumulatively increase the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. Finally, 
global average temperature increases in proportion to the logarithm of CO2 concentration. (That is, 
each doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere increases temperatures by some constant amount.) 
 
Taken together, these assumptions suggest that in any given year—holding constant productivity 
and technology—global temperature is logarithmically related to population.  That is, if population 
growth is constant, then global temperature should in any year be linearly related to growth. 
 
This is truer in the long run and with higher rates of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  In the 
shorter run or with reduced emissions, concentrations are increasingly based on historical emissions 
unrelated to current socioeconomics. 
 
                                                 
7  Social Security Administration. “B. Economic Assumptions and Methods,” 2014 OASDI Trustees Report, 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2014/V_B_econ.html#292722  
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Elements other than population do come into play. Faster or slower population growth may change 
the proportion of the population that is of working age and therefore engaged in production. 
Cumulative emissions depend on the population path and the distribution among various economies 
rather than just the current global population. Higher levels of output may raise the price of fossil 
fuels, inducing production to be less carbon-intensive. Carbon cycles in and out of the atmosphere, 
and of course CO2 is not the only relevant gas to consider when projecting climate change. 
 
To handle most of these complications, we turn to an integrated assessment model (IAM). There exists a 
good deal of variation among IAMs, each with strengths and weaknesses, focusing on regional or 
global economies.  One publicly available model, GCAM8 (previously MiniCAM), links 14 regional 
economies through a global energy market. For each region, GCAM takes as exogenous the 
population, the population’s participation rate in the labor force, and the growth in the average 
productivity of each participant. In this paper, we adopt the productivity assumptions in the 
Reference scenario provided with the GCAM model. By varying the socioeconomic inputs to 
GCAM (specifically population and labor force participation) we may predict the impact of 
population growth on global average temperature. 
 
 
Socioeconomic Projections 
 
To construct our scenarios, we use population projections from the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).9 The 2012 World Population Prospects provides eight 
different projections for population by country, five-year age group, and sex for every five years 
through 2100.10 Of the eight projections, we consider three similar variants—the Low, Medium, and 
High. We also construct a less demographically rigorous variant (Very Low) with very low 
population growth.11 
 
Each country is assigned to one of the 14 regions as closely as may be determined.12 For each 
variant-region-year, we compute the total population and the share of the working-age population 
                                                 
8  University of Maryland. “Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM),” Accessed 9, 2014. 
http://wiki.umd.edu/gcam/index.php/Main_Page 
9  United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 
Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables ST/ESA/SER.A/336. 
10  United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 
Revision, Extended Dataset, http://esa.un.org/wpp/ASCII-
Data/DISK_NAVIGATION_ASCII.htm#DB03_Population_ByAgeSex_Quinquennial2.  
11  For every country, year, age group, and sex, we simply assign a Very Low population such that the Low variant population is the 
geometric mean of the Very Low and Medium populations. That is, the Very Low equals the square of the Low divided by the 
Medium. 
12  See “GCAM 3.0 Agriculture and Land Use: Data Sources and Methods,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 2011,  Table A.1 
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-21025.pdf.  Note that the assignations are largely 
geographical. The inclusion of Taiwan into the “China” region is not a statement regarding its political status. 
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(age 20-64). Based on the Reference labor force participation rate (presented as a share of total 
population) we re-compute the 2005 participation rate as a share of working-age population.  We 
assume that between 2005 and 2050, this share moves linearly to 85 percent and holds thereafter. 
Finally, we readjust the projected participation rates to be shares of total population and then scale 
total population so that each region’s population matches the Reference scenario in 2005. 
 
Figure 1 shows the resulting global populations for each variant. The populations in 2100 for the 
primary variants (Low, Medium, High) range between 6.7 and 16.6 billion with an extended (Very 
Low) projection of 4.5 billion.13 Both the Low and Very Low variants show declining populations in 
the second half of the century.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Global Population 
 
Source: DESA and authors’ calculations. 
 
The Reference scenario is successively modified in turn to reflect each variant’s estimate of 
population and labor force participation and the adjusted scenario is input into GCAM. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13  Due to the effects of aggregating regions, the total population in the Very Low variant is larger than would be estimated from a 
direct application of footnote 11. 
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Model Socioeconomics 
 
By default, CGAM estimates GDP directly from socioeconomic inputs. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of world GDP (in 1990 USD PPP) for the four scenarios. Observations are connected by 
scenario and by year, with each straight colored line representing a year (in this case, the top line is 
2100).  
 
FIGURE 2 
World GDP 
 
Source: GCAM, DESA, and authors’ calculations. 
 
GDP is nearly proportional to population, but per-capita GDP varies by scenario on account of age 
and aggregation of populations of different productivity as seen in Figure 3. For each region, we 
hold constant productivity across scenarios, so there is no direct effect of population on per-capita 
GDP. 
  
 Very Low 
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FIGURE 3 
Contributions to Per-Capita GDP in 2100 (relative to Medium scenario) 
 
Source: GCAM, DESA, and authors’ calculations. 
 
Model Results 
 
Economic output results in increased emissions of CO2, though the efficiency of carbon 
consumption improves over time. We see this in the GCAM results of Figure 4. 
 
FIGURE 4 
CO2 Efficiency of GDP 
 
Source: GCAM, DESA, and authors’ calculations. 
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These projections are derived from a relatively high-emissions baseline. By way of comparison, the 
more detailed estimates14 show emissions of about 19 gigatons of carbon (GtC) in 2100 for the A2 
medium-population scenario and rising to 30 GtC for the high. Nevertheless, from the Medium to 
High scenario the relative increase in emissions here is comparable—some 59 percent. 
 
Though a small proportion of matter in the atmosphere, once it is introduced CO2 remains there 
for a relatively long time. Thus, concentration of CO2 is closely related to cumulative emissions 
made over long periods. Figure 5 shows the relationship between emissions and concentration of 
CO2. 
 
FIGURE 5 
CO2 Emissions and Atmospheric Concentration 
 
Source: GCAM, DESA, and authors’ calculations. 
 
The above relationship is not identical from scenario to scenario, as CO2 is not the only climate 
driver varying with socioeconomic alternatives. However, CO2 concentration clearly provides a large 
amount of information. Temperature is roughly proportional to logarithm of CO2 concentration. 
 
Stepping back away from CO2 as a specific driver of temperature, however, in Figure 6 we may 
observe directly the relationship between population and GCAM temperature results based on all 
modeled forcings. 
 
                                                 
14  See: O'Neill, Dalton, Fuchs, Jiang, Pachauri, and Zigova. "Global Demographic Trends and Future Carbon Emissions," Figure 4, 
http://www.pnas.org/content/107/41/17521/F4.large.jpg. 
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FIGURE 6 
Population and Climate Change 
 
Source: GCAM, DESA, and authors’ calculations. 
 
GCAM results based on these socioeconomic scenarios show that a 1 percentage point increase in 
the average annual rate of global population growth between 2005 and 2100 may raise temperatures 
by an average of 2 degrees Fahrenheit. Over time, the temperature change is greater and becomes 
increasingly sensitive to population growth. 
 
As noted previously, this result derives from a relatively high emissions baseline. If technology or 
economics (such as reducing work hours15) produces a path of lower emissions, then the impact of 
population growth may be correspondingly lessened. However, there does appear to be an 
important climate benefit to slower population growth. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen that population growth worldwide will help determine the extent of climate change. 
While many fear the impact of an aging population, such demographic changes passed quietly in 
most developed countries and future policy changes may be relatively small. 
 
                                                 
15  See: David Rosnick, “Reduced Work Hours as a Means of Slowing Climate Change,” Center for Economic and Policy Research, 
February 2013, http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/climate-change-workshare-2013-02.pdf.  
 The Consequences of Increased Population Growth for Climate Change 9 
 
On another part of the political spectrum, there is a reluctance to discuss the impact of population 
growth on climate change for fear of promoting a Malthusian or even racist discourse.  However, 
even if one were to focus on the geographical areas with the fastest-growing projected population – 
most importantly, Africa – the most important policies that would reduce population growth aim to 
satisfy the basic unmet needs of individuals and families. Low-income countries have high 
population growth rates because they are in the process of a “demographic transition” from a state 
of high birth rates matched by high mortality rates, to a state of lower birth rates and lower mortality 
rates, and therefore lower population growth. Higher-income countries, and to varying degrees 
middle-income countries, have made this transition. 
 
There are many positive economic and social policies that can promote this transition to lower birth 
rates.16  Among them are: more security in old age, which reduces the need for people to have 
children for support when they are older, or help with farming; the education of girls and women 
and increased economic opportunities for them, as well as affordable contraception and 
reproductive choice; lower infant and child mortality, which reduces the need for families to have 
more children based on probability of survival; and increased literacy, education levels, and 
productivity generally.  These are some of the most fundamental features of economic development.  
It is much more prejudicial to the interests of people in developing countries to focus solely on 
direct reductions of greenhouse gas emissions than it is to recognize the benefits of reducing 
population growth through economic and social progress. 
 
As for the high-income countries, it is often assumed that since some of them have low or zero 
population growth, there is not much reduction in population growth that can occur.  However, 
population growth can also be negative, as it is today in Germany and Japan; and it can be further 
reduced even when it is negative.  Any reduction in population growth in high-income countries, 
even starting from zero or negative rates, will have much more impact on reducing climate change 
than the same size reduction in low-income countries, because of the much higher per capita 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in the high-income countries. 
 
A worldwide effort at lower population growth will not prevent significant climate change. More 
comprehensive efforts to prevent carbon emissions in particular will be required and they will be 
needed soon. However, fears about supporting an aging population do not preclude accelerating-- 
let alone warrant reversing-- the demographic transition to low population growth.  
                                                 
16  For overviews, see Sachs, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet, Chapters 7 and 8; and Lam, and David, 2011. "How the 
World Survived the Population Bomb: Lessons From 50 Years of Extraordinary Demographic History." Demography , 48(4): 
1231-1262.   
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